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The Swedish Labor Market 
since 1960 
Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
When applied to the labor market, the “Swedish model” has two key elements. 
The first is centralized bargaining. For nearly forty years, the main components 
of Swedish wages and working conditions were determined in central negotia- 
tions between the largest labor organization, LO, and the employers’ associa- 
tion, SAF. The other is a set of extensive labor market policies formulated by 
the government, intended to maintain full employment, encourage investments 
in human capital, and facilitate labor mobility. In its heyday in the early 1970s, 
the Swedish model was widely praised for promoting growth while eliminating 
poverty and avoiding widespread unemployment. By 1980, Sweden had com- 
bined one of the world’s highest living standards with the lowest level of in- 
come inequality in the developed world. 
But times have changed. Centralized bargaining was largely abandoned dur- 
ing the  1980s, when  key  employers  and unions defected  from the process. 
Wage inequality and the returns to skill have since risen somewhat, although 
they remain low by world standards. These changes occurred against a back- 
ground of slow economic growth, which fueled doubts about the efficiency of 
Sweden’s highly structured labor market, huge public sector, and related wel- 
fare state institutions. 
Per-Anders Win is professor of  industrial relations in the Department of Economics at Uppsala 
University in Sweden and an NBER research economist. Robert Topel is the Isidore Brown and 
Gladys J. Brown Professor in  Urban and Labor Economics at the University of  Chicago and a 
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The current crisis has only added to those doubts. At this writing, open un- 
employment is at its highest level since the 1930s, soaring to 18 percent among 
youths (1993), and real wages have stagnated for over a decade. Critics com- 
plain that an ossified labor market is a major contributing factor. They argue 
that taxes and labor market policies reduce productivity and incentives while 
Sweden’s obsession with equality has discouraged investments in the human 
capital and skills that drive long-term economic growth (Lindbeck et al. 1993; 
Henrekson, Jonung, and Stymne 1993). 
Our goal in this paper is to understand the allocative effects of labor market 
institutions and policies in Sweden during the last thirty years. At one level, 
this involves documenting the “facts” about Swedish labor market institutions 
and performance, and a large portion of the paper is devoted to this task. How 
have relative wages evolved in Sweden? How  did wage compression affect 
particular industries? What was the role of the public sector? In the restructur- 
ing of the Swedish labor market, who moved from contracting industries, and 
where did they go? And how did declining returns to skill affect investments 
in human capital? 
Our main findings are as follows: 
1.  Centralized  Bargaining  and  Wage Inequality.  Centralized bargaining- 
which was initiated by employers but later rejected by them-greatly  affected 
wage differentials in Sweden. From the mid-1960s through the  1970s, skill 
differentials in wages fell along every observable dimension, including age, 
education, sex, and percentiles of  the wage distribution. Our reading of  the 
evidence is that the decline in wage inequality is greater than what would have 
been generated by market forces alone. There is some evidence that declining 
returns to skill have reduced investments in human capital and education. Em- 
ployer attitudes toward centralized bargaining changed in the 1980s, possibly 
because an  artificially compressed wage  distribution caused a  shortage of 
skilled workers. 
2. Wage Compression and Employment. The original advocates of a solidaristic 
wage policy argued that wage compression would push workers from low- 
to high-wage sectors and raise overall productivity. Observed labor flows are 
consistent with this goal. Low-wage industries contracted, and displaced work- 
ers were absorbed by growing, high-wage sectors of the labor market. Unlike 
the experience of  other European countries, Sweden’s move  toward a more 
compressed wage distribution was not accompanied by  rising unemployment. 
3. The Role of Labor Market Policies and the Public Sector Sweden maintains 
an  array of  government policies designed to maintain full employment. We 
find that active labor market policies have  not had much effect in reducing 157  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
unemployment.  Further, for men, there is only weak evidence that the rapid 
expansion of the public sector helped maintain full employment. The story is 
different for women, however. Virtually all the post- 1970 increase in women’s 
employment is accounted  for by the growth of public sector jobs. Women’s 
wages have converged toward men’s, and female labor force participation has 
expanded because  the  public  sector hires  whatever  female  labor  supply  is 
forthcoming. 
4.  The Rising Direrence between Individual Productivity and Consumption. 
Sweden’s redistributive policies go far beyond a compressed wage distribution. 
Rising payroll taxes, which reached 43 percent in  1989, are used to finance 
social insurance programs. In the long run, most of this tax is shifted backward 
onto labor, so real wages have been  stagnant or declining in spite of  slowly 
rising productivity. Further, at the margin for skilled workers the payroll tax is 
a pure wedge. For skilled workers, we estimate that in 1990 the combination 
of payroll, income, and value added taxes meant that consumable income was 
only 2 1 percent of individual productivity. 
For students of wage determination, Sweden presents a puzzle. Egalitarian 
policies that raised the relative wages of the less skilled did not produce wide- 
spread unemployment, although these policies did displace large numbers of 
workers. How was full employment maintained? We close the paper with a 
new  analysis of  how wage compression and full employment can occur to- 
gether. Our analysis shows that a negotiated compression of the wage distribu- 
tion can raise the demand for unskilled labor, with the result that full employ- 
ment  is  maintained.  But  our  analysis  also  predicts  that  the  inefficiencies 
of centralized bargaining accumulate over time, which  may lead to its ulti- 
mate demise. Significantly, major industries began to defect from the system 
in the  1980s, after which negotiations have shifted to the industry and  firm 
levels. 
The elimination of extreme poverty in Sweden must be counted as the main 
achievement of the welfare state. There is no doubt that labor market institu- 
tions played a central role in this. Yet  egalitarian  policies must confront the 
universal trade-off between equity and efficiency. In the case of Sweden’s labor 
market, it is hard to escape the conclusion that an overriding emphasis on eq- 
uity carries substantial social costs in terms of misallocated resources and re- 
duced incentives. These costs have probably risen, in part because the ineffi- 
ciencies  of  intervening  in  the  labor  market  tend  to  accumulate,  and  also 
because market forces probably have favored rising income inequality over the 
past decade. Given the degree of equity that Sweden has achieved, the costs of 
allowing somewhat more inequality are likely to be small, while the benefits 
in terms of improved efficiency and welfare may be substantial. 158  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Tope1 
4.1  The Institutional Setting 
4.1.1  Collective Bargaining and the Swedish Model 
The historical development of centralized bargaining is key to understand- 
ing the Swedish labor market.’ Wages in Sweden are mainly the outcome of 
collective bargaining, with little or no direct involvement by  the government. 
Union membership figures since 1950 are given in figure 4.1. In stark contrast 
to the United States, more than 90 percent of  Swedish employees belong to 
labor unions, a figure that has risen from about 75 percent in  1960.* Since 
1938, there has been more or less formal cooperation in labor relations be- 
tween the largest labor organization, LO (the Swedish Trade Union Confedera- 
tion), which represents blue-collar workers, and SAF (the Swedish Employers 
Federation). LO and SAF  were the dominant private parties in the labor market 
until the 1970s, when unions representing white-collar and professional work- 
ers became important. 
The unique aspects of the Swedish model evolved after 1950. Before then, 
the collective-bargaining environment was similar to that in the United States. 
Industrial unions affiliated with LO negotiated separate agreements with em- 
ployers, who were affiliated with SAF. Coordination of policies or strategy by 
the two dominant organizations was limited. Interestingly, SAF was the main 
proponent of centralized bargaining in the early 1950s, allegedly believing that 
coordinated  wage  negotiations  would  avoid  industrial  unions’  attempts  to 
“leapfrog” each other in wage settlements. Indeed, LO unions were reluctant 
participants in the first central agreement, which was signed in 1952. 
By 1956, however, LO leadership came to view centralized bargaining as a 
device to achieve a “solidarity” wage policy, which would reduce wage in- 
equality among union members. In its early form, this policy was rooted in 
ideas of  LO economists Gosta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner. They argued that 
coordinated wage settlements would eliminate pay differences between simi- 
larly  skilled individuals, thus reducing  income inequality, while promoting 
growth and the restructuring of the economy. One interpretation of this view, 
which we develop below, is that decentralized collective bargaining produced 
noncompetitive wage differences among industries. These differences impede 
the efficient allocation of  labor among sectors. Then a coordinated policy of 
“equal pay for equal work” more closely mimics a competitive wage distribu- 
tion, with attendant gains in efficiency. On this view, there is no trade-off be- 
1. For more detailed descriptions of the institutional setting, see, e.g., Ullenhag (1970),  Elvander 
(1988). and Nilsson (1993). 
2. Our estimates of  union coverage are ratios of union membership to non-self-employed work- 
ers. This makes our estimates larger than those that use the entire labor force as a base. We think 
the distinction is important, especially in early years, when a large portion of the Swedish work- 
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tween  equity  and  efficiency; instead, they  are  complements in  producing 
greater social welfare. 
Whatever the reasons, egalitarianism became a main ideological force be- 
hind LO bargaining policies. Nineteen central frame agreements were con- 
cluded between 1956 and 1990, and, at least through the 1970s, they coincided 
with a vast compression of the blue-collar wage distribution. Wage dispersion 
between LO and SAF contract areas fell by 66 percent between 1965 and 1972 
(Hibbs 1990). From  1970 to  1983, the log wage differential between blue- 
collar workers in the ninetieth and tenth percentiles was almost halved (see fig. 
4.2). Hibbs (1990) argues that LO policy took on an even stronger egalitarian 
stance around 1969, evolving from a goal of “equal pay for equal work” to Just 
“equal pay.” Pay dispersion within firms and across skill groups fell sharply. 
LO’s dominance of industrial relations has slowly eroded with the secular 
shift of employment toward white-collar and professional occupations (see fig. 
4.3). Unlike in the United States, in Sweden this trend has not reduced overall 
union coverage because over 80 percent of white-collar workers also belong to 
unions. Against LO’s  current membership of  2.2 million, the largest white- 
collar organization is the Central Organization for Salaried Employees, or 
TCO, with 1.2 million members, of whom half are women. Workers with uni- 160  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
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versity degrees are represented by the Swedish Confederation of Professional 
Associations,  SACO, with 330,000 members. Another aspect of the shifting 
structure of unionism is the rapid increase in the share of union members who 
work in the public sector (fig. 4.4). 
The practical importance of the trends in figs. 4.2 and 4.3 is that an ever 
larger portion of Swedish wages were determined outside the LO-SAF nexus. 
In effect, the result was a move back toward the decentralized bargaining of 
the 1950s.  This is one argument for the demise of centralized bargaining in the 
1980s: Freeman and Gibbons (1995) argue that LO could no longer deliver 
coordinated wage restraint, which was the real value of central bargaining. We 
offer an alternative explanation in section 4.4 below. 
A turning point for central bargaining came in 1983.  The employers’ organi- 
zation  for  the  engineering  industry,  Verstadsforeningen-which  includes 
Volvo, Saab, ABB, and other large firms-and  the largest industrial union, 
Metall, went outside the LO/SAF frame and negotiated a separate agreement. 
Significantly, employers argued that the frame agreements hindered recruiting 
by underpaying skilled workers. After 1983, the level of bargaining has vaned. 
Central agreements were struck on three occasions during the late 1980s, but a 
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4.2  Labor Market Performance and Policies 
4.2.1  Wages, Productivity, and Labor Supply 
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of labor productivity, real wages, and real 
wage costs since 1960. Wage costs are calculated as wages plus payroll taxes 
and are deflated by the producer price index, while wages are deflated by the 
CPI. The series are indexed to 1965, to reflect relative growth rates since that 
year. The figure shows that productivity  roughly doubled, as did wage costs, 
so labor’s share has been roughly constant since 1965. There are substantial 
short-run deviations, however, reflecting periods of  wage inflation and rising 
payroll taxes. 
The 1970s are particularly interesting in this regard. The average payroll tax 
rose from 18 percent in 1973 to 33 percent in 1976 and 37 percent in 1977! It 
reached 43.5 percent in 1989.  The figure indicates that the incidence of the tax 
was shifted forward for a while; indeed, real wages were increased in the 1975 
bargaining round, in spite of rising taxes and no productivity growth. But de- 
mands proved elastic in the longer run, which forced a series of currency deval- 
uations in the late 1970s and early 1980s. These shifted the incidence of the 
payroll tax back to labor, and real wages fell from 1979 to 1985. By 1990, real 162  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
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wages had returned to their 1979 level, and they have been roughly constant 
thereafter. 
The widening gap between pay and labor cost is not necessarily a tax wedge. 
Most of the tax finances benefits to individual workers-like  sickness insur- 
ance and pensions-that  are received in proportion to income. But most bene- 
fits are also capped, so at the margin for skilled workers the payroll tax is all 
wedge.  For these workers, the combination of  payroll,  income, and value 
added taxes meant that consumable income from a marginal dollar earned was 
only 21 percent of productivity in 1990.’ For comparison, the corresponding 
tax wedge in the United States would be about 40 percent. 
In spite of high taxes, Swedish labor force participation rates are unusually 
high (fig. 4.6). By  1990, 85 percent of  the population aged sixteen to sixty- 
four participated in the labor force, and the figures for men (87 percent) and 
women (82 percent) were trivially different. (During the current recession, 
these figures have  dropped for both  sexes.) The figure for women is much 
higher than in the United States (about 60 percent), which can reflect several 
factors. One is that social benefits are tied to work, which encourages attach- 
3. We assume a payroll tax of 43 percent, a marginal income tax rate of 50 percent, and a value 
added tax of  25 percent for this calculation. 163  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
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Fig. 4.5  The evolution of real wages, real wage costs, and productivity, 1960-93 
Source: NR (National Accounts). 
ment to the labor force.4  Nearly half of women work part-time. Another is that 
the male-female wage differential is small and declining. As we discuss below, 
the regression-adjusted  differential is slightly over  10 percent,  which is far 
lower than in the United States and other OECD c~untries.~ 
High  labor  force  participation  does  not  necessarily  translate  into  time 
worked. As shown by Burtless (1987), although male labor force participation 
fell by only 5 percent between  1963 and 1984, hours actually worked during 
the year fell by more than 20 percent.6 The difference is accounted for by rising 
absenteeism and declining hours. In Burtless’s data, absenteeism accounted for 
roughly a third of the overall decline in male labor supply, which he attributed 
to increased, generosity  of  sick  leave,  vacation,  and  child-rearing  benefits. 
Thus, in Sweden, the decline of male labor supply is accomplished mainly by 
4. For example, parents are eligible for fifteen months of paid parental leave, which encourages 
women to establish an earnings history before childbearing. Other benefits, like child-care subsid- 
ies, require that a woman work but are not tied to earnings. This encourages part-time work. 
5. From 1950 to 1960, women’s wages averaged about 70 percent of  men’s. Then LO and SAF 
agreed to phase out separate wage scales for men and women, and the ratio began to rise. The 
wage ratio in manufacturing rose monotonically thereafter, reaching about .90 by  1980 (Bjorklund 
and Persson-Tanimura 1983). 
6. Participation among American men fell by a comparable amount, but their hours fell by only 
10 percent. 164  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
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Labor force participation rates of men and women, 1965-90 
reduced  work effort  among those  who participate  in the  labor market. As 
shown in figure 4.7, the decline in  annual hours worked between  1968 and 
1981 was fairly uniform across the wage distribution. Both high- and low-wage 
men worked less. Exactly the opposite has occurred in the United States, where 
eligibility for transfer programs is more likely to be contingent on nonpartici- 
pation. In the United States, the secular decline in male labor supply is due to 
permanent labor force withdrawals, not to shortened work weeks or a reduction 
in weeks worked per year (Juhn, Murphy, and Topel  1991). Further, in the 
United States, reductions in annual hours and weeks have been concentrated 
among low-wage workers, who saw their wages fall sharply over this period.’ 
4.2.2  Unemployment and Labor Market Programs 
Full employment has been a primary goal of Swedish economic policy and 
institutions. The outcome of this policy is illustrated in figure 4.8, where we 
plot the unemployment rate and the labor market program participation rate 
since 1965. By international standards, the unemployment rate in Sweden is 
very low. This is true even if we add program participation (training and relief 
7. Hours worked among Swedish men have increased slightly (by 6.5 percent) during the 1980s 
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Fig. 4.7  Annual contracted hours by wage decile, 1967 and 1980 
Source; LNU (Level of Living Survey). 
work) to get a measure of “total” unemployment. In the late 1960s and early 
1970s, open unemployment  fluctuated  around 2 percent.  As  in the United 
States, there has been  a slight upward trend  since that time.  In the United 
States, the secular increase in unemployment is due to both longer and more 
frequent unemployment spells (Murphy and Topel 1986; Juhn, Murphy, and 
Topel 1991).  In contrast, the secular increase in Swedish unemployment is due 
entirely to longer spells (Bjorklund 1993). The difference may be due to the 
increasing generosity of the Swedish unemployment insurance system, which 
has liberalized benefit ratios and benefit durations while increasing overall cov- 
erage (Bjorklund and Holmlund  1991; Carling et al.  1996). These changes 
encouraged longer spells. This is probably not the entire story, however, since 
the duration of uninsured spells has also increased. 
The striking aspect of figure 4.8 is that unemployment stayed so low during 
the late 1960s and the 1970s, when major changes in the wage structure and 
sectoral employment occurred. To us, this is the main puzzle. According to the 
Rehn-Meidner model, full employment should be maintained through active 
labor market policy, involving among other measures retraining programs and 
mobility subsidies. While labor market programs have had some effect on mea- 
sured unemployment, we think that their overall effect on unemployment has 
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Fig. 4.8  Unemployment and participation in labor market programs as a 
percentage of the labor force, 1960-93 
Source: AKU (Labor Force Surveys); AMS (Labor Market Board). 
1. The magnitude of labor market programs is small compared to the major 
restructuring that took place. Before 1975, the participation rate in retraining 
programs and relief jobs never exceeded 2 percent. Furthermore, we would 
think that retraining would be the crucial instrument for moving workers be- 
tween sectors through upgrading of  slulls. Relief jobs are more directed at 
avoiding loss of work habits and skills. The share of training programs in the 
program participation rate reported in figure 4.8 is roughly half. Thus, the 
training participation rate is only about 0.5 percent on average between 1965 
and 1975. 
2. If retraining were an efficient way  of transferring labor from low-wage 
contracting sectors to high-wage expanding sectors, we  would expect to see 
substantial earnings gains for individuals who participate in training programs. 
According to the survey by Bjorklund (1991), the evidence on these gains is, 
at best, mixed. Substantial positive earnings effects have been found in some 
studies but not in others. We have very limited knowledge about these effects 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
3. Labor market programs are mainly targeted at the unemployed. Conse- 
quently, the programs may have acted as a brake on the trend increase in the 
duration of unemployment, but they would have little effect on rates of entry 167  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
into unemployment. In an accounting sense, it is the low inflow rate that makes 
the Swedish unemployment rate so low (Bjorklund 1993). 
We conclude that labor market programs have only a minor effect on overall 
unemployment. They do not account for the low levels of Swedish unemploy- 
ment in the 1960s and 1970s. This interpretation accords with that of Forslund 
and Krueger (chap. 6 in this volume), who study the effect of relief work pro- 
grams on regional unemployment. 
4.2.3  Inequality and Relative Wages 
Changes in relative wages and income inequality are the most interesting 
and challenging aspect of  the Swedish labor market. From the  1960s to the 
1980s, every imaginable wage differential declined.* The compression of the 
income and wage distributions was neither small nor gradual. Wage inequality 
fell in many  other countries  during the  1970s, but the fall in  Sweden was 
stronger than in most countries. In the most recent decade, there has been a 
trend toward rising inequality. Here, the increase in Sweden looks modest com- 
pared to many other developed countries, especially compared with the United 
States (Davis  1992).9  Between  1960 and  1970, the difference in log annual 
earnings between the ninetieth and the tenth percentiles of the male earnings 
distribution fell by twenty-five points, from 1.65 to 1.40.1° Then it fell by an- 
other thirty-five points, to  1.05, by  1990. Figures 4.9-4.13  below, along with 
tables 4.1 and 4.2 below, show the details of this remarkable change. 
Using  survey  data  from  two  comparable  sources,  figure  4.9  documents 
changes in the distribution of log hourly wages of Swedish men since 1968." 
The upper curve shows that, from 1968 to 1984, the 90/10 spread in this distri- 
bution fell by twenty-eight log points, from .95 to .68.12 It is noteworthy that, 
in  1968, male wage inequality was about the same as in the United States. 
There, the 90/10 differential in 1970 was about 1.05. But, in the United States, 
the 90/10 differential in men's wages increased by thirty-five log points, to 1.4, 
which is about double the corresponding spread in Sweden. This change in 
8. The data used here do not reflect nonwage compensation. This may affect our estimates since 
there is some evidence (LO 1987; Selen and Stihlberg 1992) that fringe benefits were a substantial 
part of the compensation package for a large group of workers during the late 1970s and the early 
198Os, when marginal tax rates on labor peaked. Unfortunately, there are no good data sources on 
total nonwage compensation. 
9. The trend toward rising inequality was not universal. Inequality also fell in the Netherlands 
(Freeman and Katz 1994) and in Korea (Kim and Topel 1995). See also OECD (1993). 
10. Source: Our calculations from unpublished census data for 1960, 1970, and 1990. The esti- 
mates refer to men who worked at least twenty hours in the survey week. 
11. The surveys are the Level of  Living Survey (LNU), collected by  the Institute of  Social 
Research, Stockholm University, and  the Household Market and Nonmarket Activities Survey 
(HUS), collected by the University of Gothenburg. LNU has about thirty-five hundred valid wage 
observations per year, and HUS has about sixteen hundred. See Erikson and Aberg (1987) and 
Klevmarken and Olofsson (1993), respectively. 
12. In the overall distribution, including females, the 90/10 spread fell by thirty-one log points, 
from .97 to .66. 168  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Tope1 
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Fig. 4.9  Differences in log wages of Swedish men: ninetieth, fiftieth, and 
tenth percentiles. 
Source: LNU; HUS  (Swedish Household Market and Nonmarket Activities Survey). 
distributions is even more remarkable when we consider that average living 
standards were fairly stable in both countries. 
The lower two curves in figure 4.9 show that the compression was nearly 
evenly split between the top and the bottom of  the distribution (except for 
1981). Both the 90/50 and 50/10 spreads fell by  about fourteen log points up 
to 1984. Then each rose by about five log points from 1984 to 1991. We  think 
it noteworthy that wage inequality increased after 1984, when central bargains 
between LO and SAF began to unravel. 
4.2.4  Male-Female Differentials 
Figure 4.10 shows the evolution of the male-female wage gap in Sweden. In 
1968, Swedish women earned about 23 percent less than men of comparable 
age and education. By the 1980s, the gap had narrowed to 11 percent, which 
is far lower than in any other OECD country (Blau and Kahn 1995). The data 
also show convergence between the adjusted and the unadjusted wage ratios 
for women. This is driven by  rising relative levels of schooling and experience 
in the female workforce and, as we will see, by declining returns to these ob- 
servable dimensions of skill. 
Why did the male-female wage gap narrow? There is little doubt that gender 
differences in human capital-education  and experience, for example-have 169  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
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Fig. 4.10  Female/male wage ratios, 1968-91 
Source: LNU; HUS. 
narrowed over time, as they have in other countries. Reforms in the mid-1960s 
opened up higher education for women, which produced rapid convergence in 
educational levels (see Gustafsson and Lantz 1985).13 But it is difficult to dis- 
miss institutional factors. Before 1960, LO-SAF contracts in the private sector 
included separate scales for men and women, and the male/female wage ratio 
in manufacturing had been fairly constant at .70.14 Then the parties agreed to 
eliminate the separate scales by  1965, and women’s relative wages began to 
rise. The wage ratio in manufacturing reached .8 in 1970 and .9 by 1980 (Bjor- 
klund and Persson-Tanimura 1983). This increase in relative prices occurred 
against a background  of  public policy that sought to increase female labor 
supply. Separate taxation of spouses, parental leave, and subsidized child care 
were all enacted in this period. 
These trends  suggest  that collective bargaining  may  have forced  greater 
wage convergence for women than would have occurred in an unconstrained 
market.I5 But, if this is so, what happened to the presumed excess supply of 
women? Here, the role of the public sector, and its amazing expansion, cannot 
13. Edin and Holrnlund (1995) show that college enrollment rates for women have exceeded 
14. In the public sector, separate wage scales were eliminated in 1947. 
15. Edin (1993) finds that roughly 60 percent of the convergence between  1968 and 1974 is 
those for men since the mid-I970s, and the gap has been increasing. 





be denied. Between 1971 and 1984, female employment in Sweden grew by 
29 percent, from 1.56 to 2 million. Expansion of the public sector accounted 
for 96 percent (427,000) of  those jobs. As figure 4.11 shows, public sector 
growth slowed after 1984. This turning point corresponds to the peak of  the 
femalehale wage ratio in figure 4.10 above. Thus, the data are consistent with 
the view that wage convergence is demand driven and market clearing, but the 
“market” has been  made by  a burgeoning public sector (see also Edin and 
Holmlund 1995). In short, the government supported women’s wages by  hir- 
ing them. 
4.2.5  Age-Earnings Profiles and the Returns to Job Tenure 
The relative wages of new labor force entrants have risen dramatically since 
1968. Table 4.1 records the time series of log wage differences for individuals 
with various amounts of  labor market experience, measured relative to peak 
earners with twenty-one to twenty-five years of experience. We show compara- 
ble data for the United States in order to establish a benchmark. 
In 1968, new entrants with one to five years of labor market experience had 
wages that were forty-eight log points lower than peak earners’ wages. The 
comparable estimate for the United States was only thirty-four log points, so 
o Public sector  A  Other  sectors 
1950  19bO 
year 
19bo 
Fig. 4.11  Employment of women in the public and private sectors, 
1971-92  (100s) 
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Table 4.1  Log Wage Differentials of Experience Groups Relative to Peak 
Earners in the United States and Sweden, 1968-88 
Experience Group  1969  1974  1981  1984  1986  1988 
0-5  years: 
United States  -  .34  -.44  -.41  -  .48  -  .49  -  .49 
Sweden  -  .48  -  .34  -.31  -  .30  -  .26  -.21 
United States  -.I4  -.I2  -.I8  -.I9  -.19  -.21 
Sweden  -.I9  -.I0  -.15  -.I9  -.14  .I7 
United States  -  .04  -  .oo  -  .07  -  .05  -  .06  -  .06 
Sweden  -  .09  -  .05  -.lo  -.08  -  .06  -  .06 
6-1  1 years: 
11-15  years: 
Norer Based on regressions including years of schooling and a dummy for gender, using CPS for 
the United States and LNU-HUS for Sweden. 
the experience-wage profile in Sweden was actually steeper than the U.S. pro- 
file. Most of the difference was among very recent entrants, however. Over 
time, relative wages of new entrants in the U.S. fell by  fifteen log points, to 
-  .49, which was part of a general trend toward rising skill differences in pay. 
In  Sweden, relative  wages of  new  entrants  increased  by  twenty-seven  log 
points,  eliminating  more  than  half  the  wage  differential.  By  1988, cross- 
sectional estimates imply that a new entrant could look forward to only a 20 
percent increase in pay over his career.I6 
Evidence on pay profiles within firms also points to flat profiles. Two ex- 
amples of estimates of the return to job tenure are Edin and Zetterberg (1992) 
for 1984 and le Grand (1994) for 1991. Both find extremely small effects (see 
also Bjorklund and Akerman 1989). Edin and Zetterberg estimate that ten years 
of job seniority raises wages by  only 3 or 4 percent. Le Grand’s estimate is 
even smaller, less than 2 percent. By comparison, ten years of job seniority 
yields a return of over 20 percent in American firms (Tope1 1991). Tenure pro- 
files in Japanese firms are steeper still. 
The effects of  flattened experience and tenure profiles on productivity have 
not been established empirically. But theories  abound, and all point toward 
reduced incentives to invest in human capital and to exert effort (Ben-Porath 
1967; Becker  1964; Becker and Stigler 1974; Lazear 1981). For example, if 
the bargaining process in Sweden forces flat wage profiles within firms, then 
workers have little incentive to invest in job-specific skills that raise productiv- 
ity or to strive for advancement and promotion to more responsible positions.” 
Both these effects reduce productivity. It is difficult to argue that American and 
Japanese firms, which are free to choose whatever wage profile they want, 
16. For a discussion of the relative importance of market forces and minimum wages for young 
17. For an analysis of on-the-job training and wages in Sweden, see Bjorklund and Regntr 
workers, see Ostros (1994). 
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Table 4.2  Estimated Effects of an Additional Year of Schooling on Log Wages 
and College/High School Wage Ratios, Sweden, 1968-91 
~~~ 
1969  1974  1981  1984  1986  1988  1991 
Returns to schooling: 
All workers  ,082  ,049  ,037  ,040  ,041  ,045  ,044 
0-9yearsofexperience  ,081  ,049  .034  ,025  ,049  ,040  ,036 
Highest degree  1.49  1.48  1.26  1.18  1.25  1.22  1.26 
15 vs. 12 years  1.46  1.26  1.14  1.16  1.22  1.18  1.21 
16 vs. 12 years  1.82  1.33  1.22  1.22  1.26  1.25  1.29 
Malesinmanufacturing  1.44  1.29  1.19  1.20  1.21  1.30  1.33 
Collegehigh school wage: 
Note: Based on LNU and HUS. All regressions include a gender dummy and experience (except 
the returns to schooling for workers with 0-9  years of experience). Returns to schooling is based 
on a linear years of schooling variable. The collegehigh school effect is based on various mea- 
sures, including highest degree obtained. This measure is not totally comparable over time. Alter- 
natively, we use a specification with dummy variables for individual years of schooling, where 
we use  15 years and 16 years of schooling for college and 12 years for high school. “Males in 
manufacturing” refers to mean relative earnings among males in mining, manufacturing, and con- 
struction. 
would choose steep profiles unless doing so had a substantial effect on produc- 
tivity. In this sense, Swedish organizations may be hampered by pay compres- 
sion, unless they are able to provide incentives in other ways. 
4.2.6  The Returns to Schooling 
As in the United States, the returns to schooling in Sweden fell throughout 
the 197Os.l8 But Sweden did not experience anything approaching the explo- 
sive growth in educational returns that characterized the U.S. labor market in 
the  1980s. The returns to schooling in Sweden were very low in  the early 
1980s, and it appears that these low returns have affected human capital invest- 
ment decisions. 
The first panel of  table 4.2 records regression estimates of  the return to 
schooling for various years between 1968 and 1991. We  report separate esti- 
mates for all workers and for those with zero to nine years of experience. The 
time patterns are fairly similar: starting from a high of over 8 percent per year 
in 1968, the returns to education fell by more than half by the early 1980s. The 
sharpest decline occurred between 1968 and 1974, which was the period of the 
most rapid narrowing in the overall wage distribution (see fig. 4.9 above). Re- 
turns increased somewhat after 1984, but they pale next to comparable esti- 
mates for the United States. Even at its lowest level in 1979, the effect of  an 
additional year of  schooling in the United States never fell below 6 percent, 
and it peaked at 10 percent in 1987. 
18. Here we deal only with the gross wage premium for education. We do not take taxes, sti- 
pends, and subsidized loans into account. Including such effects may have nonnegligible effects 
on the level of returns, but probably not on the basic trends over time. For further discussion, see, 
e.g., Edin, Fredriksson, and Holmlund (1994). 173  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
The second panel  shows estimates of the collegehigh school wage ratio. 
In  1968, the typical college graduate earned almost 50 percent more than an 
otherwise comparable high school graduate. That advantage narrowed rapidly, 
however, falling to just 20 percent in the early 1980s. The rate of return to a 
year of college was only 4.5 percent. The timing, but not the magnitude, of this 
decline is roughly coincident with the United States, where the collegehigh 
school wage ratio fell from 1  SO  in 1968 to 1.35 in 1979. In both countries, the 
returns to a college education drifted up in the 1980s. By 1991, the wage ratio 
had reached almost 1.3 in Sweden and a whopping 1.8 in the United States. By 
this standard, the returns to schooling in Sweden (like in many other countries) 
remain quite low. 
Have low returns affected the incentives to invest in human capital? Enroll- 
ment rates suggest that they have.I9  Figure 4.12 simply plots the percentage of 
Swedish men aged twenty to twenty-four who are enrolled in school against 
estimates of the current, cross-sectional return to a college education. The cor- 
respondence is more than striking. The enrollment rate fell by almost half be- 
tween  1968 and  1981, while the returns to schooling plummeted.  And both 
recovered slightly in the 1980s. 
Why did the returns to schooling fall? There are two obvious explanations. 
One is that compulsory schooling and the expansion of colleges and universi- 
ties has increased the number of educated workers. Then factor prices adjust 
to changes in relative quantities. The very large changes in relative schooling 
levels, graphed in figure 4.13, suggest that there is some truth to this. The labor 
force share of compulsory school graduates (up to nine years of schooling) fell 
by half, to about 30 percent, in only twenty years. At the same time, the share 
of college graduates doubled. These changes in factor ratios can be expected 
to reduce the estimated returns to schooling, as has been demonstrated in many 
countries. Indeed, Edin and Holmlund (1995) make a case that these forces 
were at work in the Swedish data. 
But the decline of returns between  1968 and 1974 appears too large to ex- 
plain  by  factor  ratios  alone.2o This  suggests  an  institutional  explanation 
grounded in central bargaining and egalitarian wage policies. We believe that 
the  returns  to  schooling  are  lower  than  would  occur  in  an  unconstrained 
market. 
4.2.7 
In some dimensions, declining wage differences can be partially explained 
by changing supply and demand factors in the Swedish labor market. For ex- 
Declining Inequality of Contract Wages 
19. For a more detailed analysis that also considers the rationing of  higher education, see Fred- 
riksson (1994). 
20. Edin and Holmlund (1995) need estimates of the elasticity of substitution between college 
and high school labor that are roughly double what is found in the United States. In other words, 
the elasticity of  substitution in Sweden would have to be twice as large as elsewhere in order to 
explain the decline in the return to schooling with changing factor ratios alone. E 
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Fig. 4.13  Educational composition of employment, 1971-92 
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ample, declining returns to schooling coincide with a steady increase in the 
supply of educated workers. Yet, in the unconstrained U.S. market, comparable 
changes in education yielded much less narrowing of wage differentials. The 
rapid decline in all wage differentials suggests to us that institutional factors 
played an important role. The obvious institutional candidate is union wage 
policy. 
We  have already mentioned LO’S egalitarian goals and “solidarity” wage 
policy.  These  goals  were  operationalized  in  the  1960s,  when  negotiated 
wage increases were given in absolute amounts (iire) instead of relative in- 
creases (percentage).  “Low-wage pots,” which were specifically targeted  at 
raising the pay of low-wage workers, were introduced in 1964. Central frame 
agreements contained both these features until 1983. 
Using micro data on blue-collar workers in the LO/SAF contract area, Hibbs 
(1990) showed that the wage dispersion  implied by  the central agreements 
tracks the actual wage dispersion well. Even though this correlation is not a 
statement about causality, we take it as an indication that union wage policy 
may have been one of the main reasons for the overall decline in wage inequal- 
ity. One of the caveats of this interpretation is associated with wage drift, the 
difference between contracted and actual wage increases, which accounted for 
45 percent  of  overall wage increases over the period,  according to Nilsson 
(1993). As illustrated by Hibbs and Locking (1991), wage drift is more im- 
portant for high-wage workers in the LO/SAF area. In a decomposition of the 
1972-82  mean wage increases by  percentile  of the  wage distribution,  they 
found wage drift to be higher than contracted wage increases for the upper 50 
percent of the wage distribution. 
4.3  Allocative Effects: Restructuring the Swedish Labor Market 
When Rehn and Meidner proposed  their model of  structural change and 
solidarity wages, they knew that efforts to raise the pay of low-wage workers 
would affect employment outcomes. Low-wage industries would be forced to 
contract,  and the workers would have to go elsewhere.  Rehn  and Meidner 
thought that they would find work in more productive sectors. 
There is abundant evidence that wage compression had allocative effects. 
For example, low-wage industries like textiles, forestry, and agriculture were 
concentrated in certain regions. Displacements from those industries called for 
regional migration as workers sought employment in the expanding regions. 
Figure 4.14 is consistent with this, showing that regional migration rates were 
unusually high in the 1960s and early 1970s, when changes in relative wages 
were largest. 
Who moved? Which industries did they leave, and where did they go? In an 
attempt to answer this, we obtained unpublished tabulations of individual data 
from the Swedish censuses of  1960, 1970, and 1990. We did not use the 1980 176  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
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Fig. 4.14  Interparish migration rates, 1945-93 
Source; SOS Bef (population statistics, Statistics Sweden). 
data because individual earnings were not recorded in that year.21  The data are 
organized by two-digit ISIC industry, and they record the number of employees 
by age, sex, and occupational status (employed vs. self-employed). The data 
are also stratified to show the number of employees of each type who fall into 
each of twenty evenly spaced intervals of the overall Swedish earnings distri- 
bution for the indicated years. In effect, we know the full earnings distribution 
for each 2-digit industry in Sweden. The tabulations for 1970  and 1990 are for 
the total Swedish population, but the 1960 data are a one-thirtieth sample. 
If restructuring were consistent with the Rehn-Meidner goals, then it should 
be  the  case  that  low-wage  industries  contracted  and  high-wage  industries 
grew.22  Figures 4.15 and 4.16  show that this was the case in both periods of 
our data. They plot male employment growth rates  for two-digit  industries 
against initial mean earnings in each industry. High-wage industries did have 
greater growth, apparently absorbing the workers who left low-wage  indus- 
tries. Table 4.3 provides regression estimates of this relation for five-year age 
21. We  use data on males who are employed and work at least twenty hours per week. The 
earnings data refer to net taxable income (samrnanriiknad inkomst for 1970 and  1990 and egen 
inkomst for 1960). For 1990, we also have a measure of labor income (arbetsinkomst).  The results 
using this measure of income are similar to those presented in the text. 
22. For  a discussion of  wage compression and productive efficiency, see  Hibbs and Locking 
(1996). A critical discussion of the importance of union wage policy is found in Svensson (1996). 177  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
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Fig. 4.15  The relation between industry employment growth, 1960-70,  and 
industry income, 1960 
Source: Swedish census data. 
Note: See the appendix for a list of industry codes. 
groups. The effect of mean initial earnings is positive for each group, with 
somewhat larger effects at younger ages. All age groups migrated toward high- 
wage industries; expansion was not achieved by  simply redirecting the flows 
of young workers to expanding sectors. 
The lack of income data for 1980 is unfortunate since virtually all the com- 
pression of the Swedish wage distribution had occurred by then. If employment 
changes are driven by changing wages, this implies less restructuring of  em- 
ployment after 1980 than before. Census tabulations of industry employment 
are available for 1980, however, which allowed us to break the 1970-90  em- 
ployment changes into two parts. The last two columns in table 4.3 show that 
the relation of employment growth to 1970 initial income was much stronger 
before 1980 than after. 
The identities of the industries shown in figs. 4.15 and 4.16 are of  some 
interest (a complete list of codes is in the appendix). For  both periods,  the 
largest proportional reductions in employment occur in agriculture (1  l), for- 
estry (12), textiles (32), and other manufacturing (39), while public employ- 
ment in education and health care (93) expands. Similar patterns appear in 
absolute changes  (not shown). The most rapidly expanding sector over the 
thirty-year period is education and health (93). It is noteworthy that the greatest 
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Fig. 4.16  The relation between industry employment growth, 1970-90,  and 
industry income, 1970 
Source: Swedish census data. 
Nore: See the appendix for a list of  industry codes. 
accords with the migration data shown above. Construction employment fell 
by about seventy-five thousand between 1970 and 1990, when regional migra- 
tion slowed. 
If wage compression is part of the cause for restructuring, is it not enough 
that workers are leaving low-wage industries? It has to be the case that wages 
rose in those industries, which drives the contraction. Figures 4.17 and 4.18 
provide evidence that this was the case. They show the relation between indus- 
try employment growth and changes in mean industry earnings. On average, 
shrinking industries had the largest proportional increases in earnings, while 
expanding industries had the smallest. The relation is especially apparent be- 
tween 1970 and 1990.23 
Regression estimates of  this relation are shown in table 4.4. We  estimate 
models of  the form 
In  -  In E,,60  = a + b(ln It,,o -  In Ic,6,,) + e,, 
23. There may be two reasons for this. First, the 1960 data are based on a much smaller sample, 
so sampling error is more important in measuring the 1960-70  changes. Second, Hibbs's (1990) 
data indicate that the compression of  intercontract wage differentials began around 1965. Long- 
run demands are more elastic, so much of  the adjustment to these changes may have occurred 
after 1970. 179  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
Table 4.3  Relative Employment Change and Income Level 
(absolute t-values in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable, 
Independent Variable 
(e70 -  e,)/e,,  (e, -  e70)/e70,  (ego  -  e70)‘e709  (em -  e*o)/eao, 
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Note: The 1960-70  equation is estimated without ISIC 11, agriculture; the relative employment 
change for this industry (+50 percent) seems unreasonable. This seems to have to do with the 
definition of  self-employment in agriculture, which decreased dramatically between  1960 and 
1970. Using an approximation for the change in agricultural employment, using the  1960 self- 
employment ratio, yields an estimate of  .068 with a t-value of 3.18. 
where  is employment in industry i, year t, and I is the mean wage (earnings) 
in the industry. Ignoring capital and other inputs, we can think of b as an “aver- 
age” of  industry-specific labor demand elasticities in response to exogenous 
changes in the industry wage  We treat wages as exogenous in this 
exercise under the hypothesis that wage compression is the outcome of LO’S 
solidarity wage policy. The same model is estimated for employment changes 
from 1970 to 1990. 
As could be seen from figures 4.15-4.18,  the data are much noisier for the 
1960-70 changes than they are for 1970-90; the smaller sample in 1960 is one 
reason for this. The 1960-70  data are even noisier when we break the sample 
down  into age categories,  although  for prime-aged  (thirty-six  to fifty-five) 
workers there is evidence of  a negative relation between changes in industry 
24. With constant returns to scale, b, is equal to labor’s share in unit cost times the elasticity of 
demand for industry output. Then let b, = b + PI.  where b is the unweighted average of industry 
labor demand elasticities. 180  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Tope1 
Table 4.4  Relative Employment Change and Relative Income Change 
(absolute t-values in parentheses) 
Dependent Variable, 
Independent Variable 
(el970 -  e1960)/e1960, 
(i1960 -  i1970)/i1960 
(el990 -  e1970)/e1970, 
(i1990  ~  i1970)/e1970 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
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(1.38) 
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-3.907  -  ,448  -  .668 
(2.45)  (4.72)  (4.50) 
-  .59  I 
(1.37) 
















Note: The 1960-70  equation is estimated without ISIC 11, agriculture; the relative employment 
change for this industry (+50 percent) seems unreasonable. This seems to have to do with  the 
definition of self-employment in agriculture, which decreased dramatically between  1960 and 
1970. Using an approximation for the change in  agricultural employment, using  the  1960 self- 
employment ratio, yields an estimate of -  1.314 with a t-value of 2.35. 
wages and changes in employment. The pattern of change for 1970-90 is much 
more systematic. There is a negative relation between employment growth and 
wage changes in every age category. Further, the estimates are nearly uniform 
across age groups. If  we interpret the estimates as reflecting labor demand 
responses, they imply long-run elasticities of about -  .5. 
The relation of employment changes to changes in mean wages can be bi- 
ased if the least-skilled workers are the ones who leave contracting industries. 
Then selection causes average wages to rise as employment falls. To eliminate 
the selection effect, we constructed  an imputed change in average industry 
earnings from (i) the number of industry i workers in each decile of the income 
distribution in the base year (say 1960) and (ii) the overall distribution of in- 
come in the ending year (say 1970). Then the imputed wage change is caused 
solely by the change in the overall earnings distribution. Using this variable as 181  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
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Fig. 4.17  The relation between industry employment growth and the change in 
industry income, 1960-70 
Source: Swedish census data. 
Note: See the appendix for a list of industry codes. 
an instrument for actual earnings changes in table 4.4 yields stronger results, 
as shown in columns 2 and 4 of table 4.4. The point estimate for 1960-70  is 
unreasonably large, although the estimate also has a large standard error. The 
estimate for 1970-90  (-.67)  is much more reasonable. 
To get an idea of how these relations work in an unconstrained labor market, 
we once again use the United States as a counterfactual. In table 4.5, we report 
regression estimates of changes in relative employment on wage changes and 
initial wage levels for industries in the manufacturing sector in Sweden and 
the United States.25  We  find that industries with high wage growth had low 
employment growth in both countries during the 1960s, the Swedish estimate 
being higher, however. This relation becomes weaker in later periods in both 
countries. The main difference between the two countries is found in the rela- 
tion between initial wages and subsequent employment growth. In Sweden, 
there is a positive and significant coefficient for initial wages for all subperiods, 
even if the magnitudes become smaller over time. In the United States, we find 
no evidence of such a relation. Thus, if we use the United States as an indica- 
tion of  how an unregulated  market works, high-wage industries grew much 
more rapidly than in an unconstrained market. 
25. We are grateful to Johnny Zetterberg for providing these data. 182  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
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Fig. 4.18  The relation between industry employment growth and the change in 
industry income, 1970-90 
Source: Swedish census data. 
Nore: See the appendix for a list of  industry codes. 
The uniform adjustment pattern across age groups in the 1970-90  data im- 
plies that restructuring was not accomplished by merely redirecting the flow 
of young workers. Prime-aged men had to leave some industries and go else- 
where. Further evidence on this is presented in tables 4.6 and 4.7. Table 4.6 
repeats the regression exercise for within-cohort employment changes. Again 
focusing on the  1970-90  data, the estimates show significant restructuring 
within cohorts in response to changes in average industry earnings. Notice that 
the estimated elasticities are about half as large as those for fixed age groups. 
This is implied if part of the employment adjustment is achieved by changing 
the distribution of the inflow of youth. 
Table 4.7 extends the cohort analysis, showing the cross-industry distribu- 
tions of employment for various birth cohorts in 1960, 1970, and 1990. The 
table leaves no doubt that workers left some industries and entered others. For 
example, consider the  cohort  born  in  1935-39,  who  were  twenty-one to 
twenty-six years old in 1960. Workers in this cohort left agriculture and manu- 
facturing, both of which contracted in the aggregate, and entered public admin- 
istration and the service industry, which nearly doubled in share. Almost all 
the overall and within-cohort expansion of  the latter industry is due to the 
growth of employment in the public sector. The growth of this sector was not 183  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
Table 4.5  Relative Employment Change in Manufacturing: Sweden and the 
United States (absolute t-values in parentheses) 
Years  Sweden  United States 
Dependent Variable, (e,,, -  e,)/e,; 
Independent Variable, (w,,,  -  w,)/w, 
1963-70  -2.820 
(3.479) 
1970-75  -.282 
(.78) 
1975-80  ,186 
(.34) 
1980-85  1.039 
(1.76) 
-  1.728 
(2.79) 
-  ,098 
(.43) 
-  ,744 
(3.51) 
,489 
(1  SO) 
Dependent Variable, (e,,,, -  e,)/e,; 
Independent Variable, w, 
1963-70  ,165 
(2.48) 
1970-75  .05 1 
(2.69) 
1975-80  .037 
(3.61) 
1980-85  .015 
(2.23) 
Note: The employment data refer to annual hours worked within each three-digit ISIC industry 
within manufacturing (twenty-eight industries). 
accomplished merely by hiring ever-larger proportions of new entrants. Rather, 
every cohort gravitated toward the public sector, and in roughly equal propor- 
tions. 
Does this mean that public employment is the sponge that soaked up the 
excess supply of low-wage workers? The evidence points in this direction, but 
this may not be the only factor at work. Other industries also grew, and some 
might have declined by  more if wage compression had not occurred. For ex- 
ample, most observers would agree that fabricated metals is the type of “high- 
wage” industry that the Rehn-Meidner program and associated public policies 
were meant to expand. This industry accounted for 16.5 percent of male em- 
ployment in 1970 and exactly the same proportion in 1990. But the comparable 
industry in the United States accounted for 16 percent of employment in 1970 
and only 8 percent in 1990, a relative decline of 50 percent. With the United 
States as  a  counterfactual, fabricated metals  “grew” as  a  source of  em- 
ployment. 
We close this section with evidence on changes in the relative skill composi- 
tion of some key industries. We index relative skill by each person’s position in 
the overall wage distribution for each year: 1960, 1970, and 1990. Six indus- 184  Per-Anders Edin and Robert Topel 
Dependent Variable, 
Independent Variable, 
(e7" -  e,,Je,i 
Age 1960  (iw -  i7nYib" 
Dependent Variable, 
Independent Variable, 
(eqn -  eJe7o; 
Age 1970  -  i7Ji,o 
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Note:  The 1960-70  equation is estimated without ISIC I I, agriculture. 
tries are shown in figures 4.19-24.  The figures show a slight increase in skills 
in low-wage agriculture, especially from  1970 to  1990, as we would expect 
from a compression of the wage distribution. At  the other extreme, relative 
skills declined in fabricated metals and machinery, where the share of workers 
in the first and second quintiles grew steadily over time. Similar declines in 
relative skill levels appear in the growing public sector. In public administra- 
tion, the decline is gradual, but, in education and health, there is an abrupt 
decline. From a distribution that was heavily concentrated in the top quintile 
in 1970, the 1990 distribution of income roughly matches the distribution for 
the overall population. 
4.4  Driving Forces in the Swedish Labor Market 
What factors have driven the performance  of the  Swedish labor market? 
Writing in the 1940s, Rehn and Meidner offered a radical agenda for managing 
the wage distribution and transforming employment in Sweden. While vague 
on details, they backed  up their policy  prescriptions  with  bold  predictions 
(even for economists) of what the outcomes would be. They thought that egali- 
tarian wage policies, implemented through central bargaining, would push la- Table 4.7  Industry Distribution of Employment by Birth Cohort 
and Year: Males 
Birth Cohort 
Year  1895-99  1905-9  1915-19  1925-29  1935-39  1945-49  1955-59  1965-69  Total 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing (ISIC I) 
1960  13.5  9.9  8.2  8.9  10.0  10.4 
1970  5.4  12.6  10.0  6.6  5.4  10.2 
1990  2.9  2.1  1.6  2.1  2.1  2.0 
Mining (ISIC 2) 
1960  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.5  1.2 
1970  .9  .8  .9  .9  .9  .9 
1990  .2  .7  .5  .4  .4  .5 
Manufacturing (ISIC 3) 
1960  43.6  39.8  40.9  39.3  43.7  41.5 
1970  35.7  34.0  33.7  34.6  37.2  34.9 
1990  32.3  31.8  28.1  29.4  34.3  30.7 
Thereof Textiles (ISIC 32) 
1960  3.7  3.2  3.0  2.5  2.2  2.9 
1970  2.5  1.8  1.5  1.2  1.2  1.6 
1990  1  .o  .6  .5  .4  .5  .5 
And Fabricated Metal Products (ISIC 38) 
~ 
1960  14.1  15.3  19.3  19.6  20.6  18.6 
1970  13.1  15.4  16.1  17.5  19.5  16.5 
1990  16.4  16.6  15.1  16.2  19.2  16.5 
Electricity, Gas, and Water (ISIC 4) 
~ 
1960  2.0  1.2  1.8  1.5  .8  1.5 
1970  1  .o  1.5  I .2  1  .o  .8  1.1 
1990  1.9  2.6  1.7  1.4  .7  1.4 
Construction (ISIC 5) 
1960  14.8  18.1  14.9  12.6  12.9  14.1 
1970  14.2  14.1  13.5  15.4  18.3  15.0 
1990  10.2  11.5  12.2  11.7  16.1  12.9 
Trade (ISIC 6) 
1960  6.7  6.4  7.3  9.4  9.8  8.7 
1970  10.0  9.7  11.3  11.5  12.0  11.1 
1990  12.3  11.2  11.5  13.4  17.0  12.3 
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Table 4.7  (continued) 
Birth Cohort 
Year  1895-99  1905-9  1915-19  1925-29  1935-39  1945-49  1955-59  1965-69  Total 
Communication (ISIC 7) 
1960  5.0  8.5  11.5  11.2  9.8  9.8 
1970  5.0  10.5  10.1  9.4  9.9  9.3 
1990  7.0  9.5  10.3  11.2  8.9  9.7 
FIRE (ISIC 8) 
1960  3.6  2.2  2.6  3.0  1.3  2.6 
1970  3.7  3.7  4.4  1.8  4.7  4.5 
9.1  9.1  10.3  9.6  7.2  9.0  1990 
Public Administration and Other Services (ISIC 9) 
1960  9.2  11.2  11.4  12.4  8.5  10.2 
1970  11.7  12.8  14.9  15.1  10.8  13.0 
1990  23.8  21.6  25.3  20.0  12.5  19.7 
Thereof Public Sector (ISIC 31, 33) 
1960  7.3  9.4  10.1  11.1  7.0  8.9 
1970  9.2  10.8  12.6  12.9  8.6  11.8 
1990  20.9  18.9  19.8  16.8  9.8  16.7 
bor into more productive uses and promote economic growth. By raising labor 
costs in low-wage sectors, they argued, low-wage employers would be driven 
out of business. Labor would then flow to high-wage sectors, which are more 
productive. To them, equity and efficiency were complements in the develop- 
ment process. 
Even with fifty years of hindsight, it is hard to quibble with the broad out- 
lines of what Rehn and Meidner predicted. From 1960 to the early 1970s, LO’S 
egalitarian  strategy compressed wage differentials  along virtually every ob- 
servable dimension. Industry and regional differences were the first to fall, 
which reduced employment in low-wage industries and forced migration from 
the north. Labor market programs were implemented to deal with the displace- 
ments, as Rehn and Meidner had advocated, but the remarkable thing to us is 
that they seem to have played such a minor role. The sum of open unemploy- 
ment and participation in labor market programs remained low throughout the 
process, while average wages and productivity grew rapidly. At this level, even 
Rehn and Meidner must have been surprised. 
While the story after 1970 is less sanguine, these facts present an important 
puzzle. How was full employment maintained in the face of interventions that 
sharply raised the relative price of low-wage workers? It does no good to argue 
that labor demands were inelastic-low-wage  industries contracted as their 
labor costs rose. Instead, the demand for these workers was apparently rising .6 
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Fig. 4.19  Male income distribution in selected industries, 1960, 1970, 
1990: agriculture 
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Fig. 4.20  Male income distribution in selected industries, 1960, 1970, 
1990: textile - 
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Quintiles of the Overall Male Income Distribution 
Fig. 4.21  Male income distribution in selected industries, 1960,1970, 
1990: machinery 
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Fig. 4.22  Male income distribution in selected industries, 1960,1970, 1990: 
retail trade 0 i 
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Fig. 4.23  Male income distribution in selected industries, 1960,1970,1990: 
public administration 
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Fig. 4.24  Male income distribution in selected industries, 1960, 1970,1990: 
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in other sectors. What drove the increase in demand? Several theories are pos- 
sible, and all may contain a grain of truth. 
The most obvious explanation is the growth of the public sector, which ac- 
celerated after  1970. The government  may have supported the price of  low- 
wage workers  by  simply hiring them, soaking up the excess of  supply over 
private demand. As we indicated above, this is broadly consistent with the facts 
for women, for whom the public  sector accounts for virtually  all increased 
employment and labor force participation. But only  15 percent of men held 
public sector jobs in 1990, up five points from 1970. Men and women must be 
good substitutes in low-wage occupations if the public  sector is to have an 
important effect on male earnings. At least for men, we do not think that expan- 
sion of the public sector is the whole story (see also Edin and Holmlund 1994). 
Another explanation is that negotiated wage settlements simply tracked mar- 
ket equilibrium outcomes. With regard to skill groups, this implies either (i) 
rising relative demand for products produced by less-skilled workers  or (ii) 
declining relative supplies of the less skilled. Edin and Holmlund (1995) find 
little evidence in favor of  implication  (i), but  changes in relative  shares of 
workers with different levels of education do favor implication (ii). Their evi- 
dence that returns to schooling move with relative supplies of education groups 
(see figs. 4.11 and 4.12 above) suggests that at least some of the move toward 
wage equality was “swimming with the tide.” 
It seems obvious that wage inequality would have declined even without a 
solidarity wage policy on the part of LO. The reduction in the market share of 
low-skill workers, driven by increased schooling levels, was huge. This would 
reduce inequality directly by reducing the share of the low-wage workers and 
also indirectly by changing relative prices, as Edin and Holmlund show. But it 
also seems obvious that inequality fell by more, and more quickly, than can be 
explained by  market forces alone. Hibbs’s (1990) estimate that wage differ- 
ences between contract areas fell by more than half in a period of  six years 
(1966-72)  is too large to explain as an outcome  of  slowly changing factor 
proportions.  The  similarly  large  and  rapid  contraction  of  within-firm  and 
between-occupation differentials, which continued through the 1970s, also ap- 
pears to indicate “overshooting”  of what would have occurred in a competi- 
tive market. 
Thus, the overall compression of wages in Sweden must exaggerate the ef- 
fect of  central bargaining and LO policies. Some of  it would have occurred 
anyway. But, in our view, LO also achieved its egalitarian goals. Wage differen- 
tials and inequality fell by more than can be explained by market forces alone. 
These conclusions mean that central bargaining did constrain the Swedish 
wage structure. Yet there is little evidence of excess supply. There are at least 
three theories that are consistent with these facts. Each relies on expanding 
labor demand, driven by declining wages in high-wage industries, to soak up 
displaced workers. A common theme is that the LO-SAF bargains delivered 
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than simply to impose a wage floor and watch unemployment rise. We outline 
the models in turn. 
4.4.1  Model 1 : Decentralized Bargaining and Industry Rents 
Sweden was already heavily unionized in 1950, with about 75 percent of the 
non-self-employed  workforce  belonging  to  labor unions.  Bargaining  took 
place at the company and industry level, and there were significant interunion 
wage differences. It was in this environment that SAF-the  employers federa- 
tion-pushed  for central bargaining.  Most explanations of this fact point to 
SAF’s fears of “leapfrogging”  in wage negotiations with separate unions. We 
think that it is equally plausible that high-wage  employers-who  allegedly 
dominated SAF-recognized  their gains from compressing the interindustry 
wage distribution. They counted on LO to deliver cheap labor and expand the 
“modern” sector of the labor market.26 
In this model, the costs of a solidarity wage policy are small. Indeed, central 
bargaining and the compression of interindustry wage differences may be effi- 
cient. High wages in  some sectors can reflect unions’  success in extracting 
rents in bilateral negotiations, with the result that equally productive workers 
are paid differently  across sectors. In traditional models of monopoly union- 
ism, the resulting distribution of  workers will be inefficient,  and high-wage 
sectors of the labor market will be “too small.” 
Central bargaining can internalize these costs in the same way that it inter- 
nalizes tendencies toward  wage inflation  (Olson  1982). With near-universal 
union coverage, a central bargain can more closely replicate a Walrasian wage 
distribution. Wage levels in high-wage industries will fall and their demand for 
labor expand. Low-wage sectors contract, but there is full employment during 
restructuring because underlying market forces are pulling workers toward ex- 
panding industries. Labor market programs would therefore play a minor role. 
In its broad outline, these movements are consistent with the industrial restruc- 
turing of the 1960s and early 1970s, when between-contract wage differences 
were greatly reduced (Hibbs 1990; Holmlund and Zetterberg 1991). 
4.4.2  Model 2: Equalizing Wage Differences 
The “rationale” just given posits voluntary and efficient mobility from low- 
to high-wage  sectors. But some discussions of  the process, and of Rehn and 
Meidner’s proposals, emphasize  involuntary  mobility. Wage differences be- 
tween sectors were “too large,” in the sense of being inconsistent with egalitar- 
ian ideals, but not large enough to induce workers  to move. Then the point 
of raising  wages in low-wage  sectors was to force people to seek work at a 
higher wage. 
This scenario can make sense if some wage differentials reflect differences 
26. Moene and Wallerstein (1993) contains similar ideas in a political model of  winners and 
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in amenities across sectors rather than differences in skills. Imagine two sec- 
tors, one high wage (H) and the other low (L). Jobs in the two sectors offer 
amenities uH  and uL.  In equilibrium, the marginal worker’s welfare is equalized 
across sectors, so u(wL,  uL)  = u(wH,  uH)  and wH  >  w,  if uH  <  uL.  Now suppose 
that an egalitarian wage policy sets a wage floor above wL.  Higher wages force 
some workers to leave sector L, which contracts, raising labor supply and re- 
ducing relative wages in sector H. The equilibrium outcome entails contraction 
of the low-wage sector, migration from L to H, full employment, and declining 
wage inequality. Mobility is involuntary in the sense that workers who move 
are worse off than before, as are all workers in sector H, who now work for a 
lower wage. Intramarginal workers  in L gain-their  wage is higher-as  do 
owners of capital in H. 
This model is consistent with key features of the Swedish restructuring. In- 
duced migration from the low-wage north to the high-wage south was part of 
the Rehn-Meidner program for economic growth. Nilsson (1993) and Henrek- 
son,  Jonung,  and  Stymne (1993)  report  growing  resentment  against  these 
“moving van” policies by  the early  1970s, resulting in a policy  shift that fa- 
vored the maintenance of full employment within regions over forced restruc- 
turing. Unlike the previous model, the outcome is inefficient, although income 
redistribution benefits some low-wage workers and all high-wage  employer^.^' 
4.4.3 
The models just presented make opposite assumptions about the initial wage 
distribution that is compressed by central bargaining. Under the rents hypothe- 
sis, the initial distribution was inefficient because of differences in bargaining 
power across sectors. Wage compression was Pareto improving. With equaliz- 
ing differences, wage differences represent efficient compensation for amenit- 
ies. Wage compression reduced welfare. We believe that both have application 
to the  Swedish experience,  but even their combination  is not the  complete 
story. It is difficult to argue that the compression of wage differences across 
industries eliminated only union rents or that intersectoral differences in pay 
reflected only amenities.28  And neither model applies to the large compressions 
of  pay  that  occurred  within  firms or between  occupations  and  educational 
groups. These changes reduced the relative price of skill. 
Other factors were at work. In thinking about what they were, we believe 
that it is relevant that SAF, not LO, was the initiator of central bargaining in 
Model 3: Compressed Skill Differentials 
27. A related growth model is discussed in Age11 and Lommerud (1993). In their analysis, the 
expanding high-wage sector creates growth externalities along the lines of Lucas (1988) or Romer 
(1986). Then a case can be made that forced restructuring enhances growth as a form of “industrial 
policy.” Welfare is lower today, but it may be higher in the future. 
28. In the United States, where only 12 percent of the private sector workforce is unionized, 
interindustry wage dispersion is much larger than in  Sweden. These differences do not reflect 
union rents. This is another case where using the United States as a benchmark suggests that the 
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the 1950s and tended to support the process for the next thirty years. The domi- 
nant faction in SAF saw that it had something to gain. But, in  1983, it was 
Verstadsforeningen  and Metall-the  largest private-bargaining pair in Swe- 
den-that  first abandoned central bargaining. They claimed that skilled work- 
ers were underpaid  in  the  central  frame  agreements.  For the  employers  in 
Verstadsforeningen,  the costs of  compressed  skill differentials had  come to 
outweigh the benefits, whatever those might be, so they left the coalition. Cen- 
tral bargaining began to crumble, and skill differentials in pay began to rise. 
These points suggest that a reduced price of skilled labor was an important 
element of  central bargaining, which kept SAF involved in the short run but 
which eventually led to the demise of frame agreements. On this interpretation, 
frame agreements did not just raise the compensation of  low-wage workers; 
they also reduced the absolute wage of skilled workers. We build a simple two- 
sector, three-factor model to illustrate the forces at work.29 
We  assume three factors of  production:  unskilled labor (v), skilled labor 
(S), and capital (K).  Factor prices are Wu,  W,, and r. Skilled and unskilled labor 
are inelastically  supplied in the short run, while capital is in perfectly elastic 
supply on the world market. Both types of labor have rising supply price in the 
long run. 
Sector 1, the low-skill sector, is U intensive. Think of it as retail trade. We 
take this to the extreme and assume that sector 1 output depends only on em- 
ployment of unskilled labor: y, = F( u,).  Sector 2 is skill and capital intensive; 
think of it as manufacturing. Output is Y,  = G(U,, S, K), which embodies the 
simplifying assumption that all skilled labor is employed in sector 2. We as- 
sume that the price of sector 2 output isp(Y,) withp’(.) <  0, and we normalize 
the price in sector 1 to unity. Then competitive equilibrium implies 
Now assume that a central bargain caps the wage of skilled workers at W < 
Wr. Sector 2 employers earn rents because the contract effectively  cartelizes 
the market for skilled labor. At the old allocation of resources, (2b) no longer 
holds as an equilibrium condition. Skill has a positive shadow price, as in fig- 
ure 4.25, because there is excess demand. 
How is a new equilibrium attained? In the short run, rents accrue to the 
owners of capital in sector 2, so we expect capital to enter the industry. This 
means that (2c) no longer holds; instead, it is replaced by the condition that 
capital flows to sector 2 until there are zero profits: 








Fig. 4.25  Positive shadow price of skilled labor 
(4) 
Sector 2 becomes inefficiently large and capital intensive. 
ing on skilled labor. These are 
(5) 
(6) 
(7)  dWuldWs  -  S(pG,, + G,G,p'). 
Equation (5) indicates that the wage cap (dWs  < 0) attracts capital to sector 2 
and that the effect is proportional to the utilization of skilled labor in that sec- 
tor.30  In turn, rising capital intensity increases the demand for unskilled labor 
in sector 2 so long as capital and labor are sufficiently strong gross comple- 
pG(U2,  S,  K) -  W,U, -  WS -  rK = 0. 
Displacement of (l), (2),  and (4) yields the allocative effects of a price ceil- 
dkldW, c~ -  S < 0, 
dU,ldW, = -dU,/dW,  c~ -  S(pGu,  + GuGkp'), 
30. The model assumes that capital is in perfectly elastic supply, although this is inessential. 
With a closed capital market, investment is the outcome of domestic saving, which implies rising 
supply price. The model then implies that saving and investment increase with a wage cap, so that 
capital grows over time to a new long-run equilibrium, while intertemporal consumption decisions 
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ments (Guk  >  O).31 Unskilled labor migrates from sector 1 to sector 2, which is 
what occurred. This change in demand is also the condition for the unskilled 
wage to rise in (3), further reducing wage inequality. Notice that the market 
for unskilled labor always clears-there  is no induced unemployment in the 
model because the egalitarian policy actually increased the demand for un- 
skilled labor. The market that does not clear is for skilled labor, where there is 
excess demand. 
This point takes on added relevance in the long run, when the assumption 
of inelastic supplies of skill groups is less appropriate. Lindbeck et al. (1993), 
Henrekson, Jonung, and Stymne (1993), and others have argued that the distor- 
tionary effects of egalitarian policies are large because participants will even- 
tually adjust to changed incentives. Lindbeck is especially forceful on this, 
pointing out that long-run distortions are likely to be much more serious be- 
cause patterns of behavior adjust slowly. 
Our model has this flavor and produces additional implications. With endog- 
enous investment in human capital, the long-run supply of skilled workers will 
depend on the skill premium, W, - W,. A higher wage premium encourages 
investment and raises overall productivity. Wage compression causes the rela- 
tive supply of skilled labor to fall over time, much as we found for the returns 
to schooling in table 4.2 above. By  raising the marginal product of  skilled 
labor, a declining share of skilled labor increases the wedge between the social 
value of skill and its price. The welfare costs of wage compression cumulate 
because incentives to invest in skill are distorted. Inefficiencies are small in the 
short run, when stocks of skill are fairly fixed, but they loom large in the long 
run, when the supply of skill is elastic. 
This fact is consistent with the ultimate unraveling of centralized bargaining. 
As the shadow price of  skill rises, the gains to defecting from the central 
agreement also rise. Firms that hire skilled labor are tempted to compete to get 
it, and the skilled unions they deal with also have more to gain from defection. 
This is our interpretation of  why Verstadsforeningen and Metal1 eventually 
dropped out of  the central frame. In the short run, central bargaining effec- 
tively cartelized the market for skilled workers and artificially increased the 
demand for unskilled ones. Skill-intensive firms gained. But the cost of main- 
taining narrow skill differentials rises through time because human capital in- 
vestments are discouraged. As skilled labor becomes more scarce, the gains 
from cooperation are eventually swamped by the benefits of defection, which 
spells the demise of central bargaining. 
To provide some empirical information on this hypothesis, we report a mea- 
sure of  the relative scarcity of  skilled workers in figure 4.26. Our admittedly 
imperfect measure of  scarcity is obtained from survey data on firms. We  use 
the proportion of firms that report difficulties in recruiting skilled workers rela- 
31. Complementarity is sufficient if Sweden is a price taker  on world markets  for  sector 2 
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Fig. 4.26  Relative scarcity of skilled blue-collar labor 
Source: KI (National Institute of Economic Research). 
tive to the proportion of firms that report difficulties in recruiting other (un- 
skilled) workers.32  This measure shows a dramatic increase in the relative scar- 
city of skilled workers in the early 1980s. This picture seems consistent with 
the hypothesis that excess demand for skilled labor contributed to the break- 
down of centralized bargaining. The question, however, is to what extent this 
excess supply was due to a reduced supply of skills. It seems reasonable that 
compressed skill differentials should produce a trend decline in the supply of 
skills. Our measure of  scarcity does not show a strong trend prior to  1980. 
Together with the very sharp increase in the early 1980s, it seems that other 
factors than a gradual decline in the supply of skills were also at work. 
In this model, a complete breakdown of central bargaining spells the col- 
lapse of the market for unskilled workers (and of investment). In fact, if mar- 
kets are allowed to clear, there will be even more wage inequality than would 
have occurred without egalitarian policies. The reason is that long-run factor 
ratios adjusted to the egalitarian wage structure, so the ratio of  unskilled to 
skilled workers is artificially high. If unions try to stem the tide and keep the 
unskilled wage high, the result will be unemployment. 
We do not believe that the end of central bargaining caused a reversion to 
market wages; skill premiums and inequality have widened, but not dramati- 
32. We are grateful to Bertil Holmlund for making us aware of, and providing, these data. 197  Wage Policy and Restructuring 
cally. But it is true that the burden of the current crisis has fallen more heavily 
on fewer workers than in any earlier contraction,  with unemployment rates 
not seen since the 1930s. In our model, this is a consequence of  the end of 
wage compression. 
4.5  Conclusions 
Our reading of the evidence is that Swedish labor market institutions matter. 
Centralized bargaining, which was first initiated by  employers but later re- 
jected  by  them, played an important role in compressing  wage differences. 
Compared to market outcomes, egalitarian wage policies reduced pay differ- 
ences along virtually every dimension of  skill, to different degrees. This was 
an important component, perhaps the important component, of Sweden’s sharp 
decline in income inequality. 
Our evidence indicates that pay compression had important effects in shift- 
ing the allocation of labor across sectors. Low-wage industries were forced to 
contract, as one would expect from an increase in the pay of low-wage workers. 
The puzzle is that wage compression  did not generate high unemployment: 
Swedish unemployment rates were unusually low during the period of  declin- 
ing inequality. We find that public policies had little role in maintaining low 
unemployment. Expansion of the public sector helped bolster demand for low- 
wage workers, especially for women. Yet  it appears that the relative private 
demand for less-skilled labor was rising. The labor market cleared at negoti- 
ated wage levels. 
Despite evident market clearing for unskilled labor, we do not believe that 
wage bargains simply tracked what would have occurred in an unconstrained 
market. Wage compression occurred much too quickly for that. Instead, negoti- 
ated wage bargains may have bolstered the demand for less-skilled workers 
while delivering “cheap” skilled labor to large employers. This policy achieves 
redistribution at low cost in the short run, but distorted incentives can cause 
large inefficiencies in the long run. 
Appendix 
Industry Codes 
The following is a list of  ISIC industry codes used in the analysis of  1960, 
1970, and  1990 census data. A limited number of industries were excluded 
owing to difficulties in linking the 1960 industry code to the ISIC code used 
in 1970 and 1990. 
11  Farming, hunting 





























Mining and quarrying 
Manufacture of food, beverages, and tobacco 
Textile, wearing apparel, and leather industries 
Manufacture of wood and wood products, including furniture 
Manufacture of paper and paper products, printing and publishing 
Manufacture  of  chemicals,  petroleum,  coal,  rubber,  and  plastic 
products 
Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products, except products of pe- 
troleum and coal 
Basic metal industries 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, machinery, and equipment 
Other manufacturing industries 





Restaurants and hotels 
Transport and storage 
Communication 
Banking and financial services 
Insurance 
Real estate 
Public administration, defense, police and fire departments 
Sanitary services 
Education, research, health care 
Recreational and cultural services 
Domestic services 
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